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Abstract. This study analyzes the 
effects of gender diversity and 
corporate governance on firms' 
performance in Asian major economies. The study finds a positive 
and significant impact of gender diversity on firms' performance. 
Besides, the study explored the significant role of executive female 
directors as compared to non-executive female directors. The 
impact of board characteristics and ownership structure on firms' 
performance were also examined and found the evidence of 
positive association of them with firm's performance in most cases 
except India (where the state ownership exhibited negative impact 
on firm's performance). The study also provides a comparative 
analysis of developed and developing economies in Asia and 
reported the significant role of female representation in emerging 
markets as compared to developed and overall market results. 
Lastly, the study also confirms the non-existence of reverse 
causality between gender diversity and firms' performance by 
applying t-tests and breaking down the sample according to 
women's participation in the corporate board. The results confirm 
the role of female representation on firm performance from 
tokenism to critical mass. Consequently, the results strongly 
suggest that gender diversity in firms' boards needs to be 
enhanced, compulsory laws being a key determinant to achieve the 
desired results in the Asian context. 
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1. Introduction 
The gender diversity in corporate board composition has got tremendous 
importance among corporations and reviewed extensively by researchers (Li & 
Chen, 2018; Terjesen, Aguilera, & Lorenz, 2015). The researchers from the 
developed markets (e.g. Conyon & He, 2017; Mohammad, Abdullatif, & 
Zakzouk, 2018; Post & Byron, 2015) have debated whether female 
representation on corporate board has enhanced firm's performance? However, 
the empirics' verdicts on gender issues seem rather ambiguous and inconsistent. 
For instance, Kim and Starks (2016) and Post and Byron (2015) reported a 
positive impact of gender diversity on firms' performance; whereas, Adams and 
Ferreira (2009) and Terjesen, Couto, and Francisco (2016) concluded a 
negative relationship between the two. These opposing findings might be 
attributed to the different data spans, contexts, and measures used for firms' 
performance (Ferreira, 2015; Joecks, Pull, & Vetter, 2013). Besides, the 
researchers refer to female presence as tokenism (Torchia, Calabrò, & Huse, 
2011), as it refers to members meeting the ceremonial requirements; however, 
not fulfilling basic features that are required for a board member. Hence, their 
contribution remains limited as they are only hired for legal compliance 
(Torchia et al., 2011).  
1.1 State of gender diversity in Asia 
In Asia, it is of specific significance as female representation among higher 
management remains below par (Dezsö & Ross, 2012). According to the 
Gender Diversity Index report, 60 countries have endorsed gender diversity and 
highlighted that female member occupy only 15% representation on boards 
globally. This explains a positive tendency as female representation as 
executives and board chairperson hikes; it is more probable to spur higher 
diversity. Nonetheless, the women percentage as Chief Executive Officers and 
board chair is only 4% worldwide. Though the percentage of women on 
corporate board is increasing in Asia (7.8%); however, this increase is 
substantially slow as compare to the developed regions of the world including 
14.5 % in the US and 22.6% in Europe. Despite the existing literature that has 
proven the significant impact of gender diversity on firms' performance, 
customers' sensitivity, and strong governance, the Asian firms still lag behind 
the international counterparts to place women in executive positions. Table 1 
reports the statistics of the sample of the study as per Global diversity index 
2018. 
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Table 1 Gender Diversity Rank and Score of the Selected Countries  
Variables  China India Japan Korea Singap
ore 
Thailand 
Global index rank 100 108 114 118 65 75 
score 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.65 0.70 0.69 
Economic participation 
and opportunity 
rank 86 139 114 121 27 24 
score 0.65 0.38 0.58 0.53 0.75 0.77 
Educational attainment rank 102 112 74 105 94 106 
score 0.96 0.95 0.99 0.96 0.98 0.96 
Health and survival rank 144 141 1 84 101 51 
score 0.92 0.94 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.98 
Political empowerment rank 77 15 123 90 101 127 
score 0.16 0.41 0.08 0.13 0.11 0.07 
GDP growth in billions 
of USD 
 23,159 9,459 5,405 2,029 4,879 1,261 
Source: constructed from Global diversity index 2018 and IMF report 
Terjesen and Singh (2008) find a high correlation between the female 
numbers of the board to the structures of individual economy, hence the degree 
to tokenism and ability to participate vary from culture to culture. To address 
the concern of tokenism in Asia, it's very important to test the prevalence of 
tokenism in each economy separately rather than on a collective sample. 
Moreover, as reported by the Asian Corporate Governance Association 
(ACGA), Asia lagged from the other developed economies as for the corporate 
governance standards are concerned. 
From the research perspective, the role of the Board of Directors (BoD) has 
remained the main concern for researchers (Wirtz, 2011). Hence, many features 
connected to board composition and its structure are considered by researchers 
as the key features of an operational governance mechanism being able to 
improve firms' performance (Achim, Borlea & Mare, 2016). However, the 
academic debate on the linkage between them is quite open. The scholars are 
unable to conclude this complexity (Dalton & Dalton, 2011; McGuire, Dow & 
Ibrahim, 2012) and reported multiple contradictory linkages including 
executives and non-executive directors, their remunerations, meeting 
behaviors, and their linkages to other board (Sanjai Bhagat & Black, 2001). 
Yet, researchers are unable to collectively control board structure, 
remuneration, and ownership distribution. 
The study also considers ownership dispersion as the determinant of firms' 
financial performance in Asia following the concepts visualize by existing 
researchers (Konijn, Kräussl, & Lucas, 2011; Post & Byron, 2015). Besides, 
the study applies board characteristics and measures of ownership structures to 
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offer new insight in the Asian context following previous researchers from the 
western market (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2001; Sanjai Bhagat & Black, 1999). 
Finally, Asia is the home of several diverse religions, customs, and beliefs. 
Moreover, these diversities are critical to comprehend as they have a great 
influence on the ways businesses are done and the market reacts. The 
governance structure, ownership concentration, and diversity law are 
systematic factors and it's very important to analyze them separately because 
the impacts of these variables may be diverse based on each economy (Post & 
Byron, 2015). Besides, the adoption of diversity law in each country varies 
across times and even some countries included in the sample don't have 
diversity law, generation dummy for meta-analysis makes the outcomes more 
confusing. So the study prefers country-level analysis over meta-analysis and 
provides quite a significant contribution in prevailing literature. 
The subsequent sections include a literature review and hypotheses 
development, data characteristics, methodology, empirical findings, discussion, 
and conclusion. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
The subsequent text addresses the issue in detail. 
2.1 Gender diversity on board and performance of firms 
The board diversity continues to grow as a major concern for the corporate 
board as it may influence firm-level outcomes (Terjesen et al., 2015); however, 
the existing literature on board diversity is inconclusive (Finegold, Benson & 
Hecht, 2007). For instance, a positive relationship of board diversity and firm’s 
performance is reported by Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2008) for Spanish 
firms, Carter et al. (2010) for Fortune 1000 firms; Erhardt, Werbel, and Shrader 
(2003) for US firms; and Julizaerma and Sori (2012) for Malaysian firm’s 
performance. In contrast, Wang and Clift (2009) find that larger Australian 
firms are inclined to more female board members but report an insignificant 
relationship between board diversity and firms' performance. A negative 
relationship for the same variables is reported by Adams et al. (2015), they 
argue that women's representation on corporate boards leads to excess 
monitoring of firms that are already not exposed to governance issues and this 
leads to poor performance. Similarly, Darmadi (2011), and Marimuthu and 
Kolandaisamy (2009) and conduct their research on Malaysian and Indonesian 
firms respectively, and report the insignificant impact of gender diversity on 
firms' performance. Post and Byron (2015) reported the potential causes for 
these inconclusive findings i.e. diversity of the country, time periods, 
estimation techniques, and the existence of possible endogeneity between the 
two. Moreover, Wang and Clift (2009) criticize several empirical approaches 
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that could weaken earlier results. So, considering these pieces of evidence, the 
following hypothesis is suggested. 
H1: The gender diversity on board has a significant impact on firms' 
performance in Asian Markets. 
2.2 Women executive and non-executive directors and firm’s performance 
The Agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), explains the 
role of an agent in favor of the principal; however, if the interests of both 
parties are opposing then this becomes a source of conflict, as the board of 
directors might not perfectly act in the best interest of principals (Walsh & 
Seward, 1990). The directors are in a fiduciary relationship with a firm and the 
literature provides debatable and controversial pieces of evidence for the 
association between directors' position and firms' performance (Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003; Goergen & Renneboog, 2014; Park & Shin, 2004). A corporate 
board generally includes both executive and non-executive directors and these 
executives work besides the board to establish the organizational strategic plan. 
These executive directors not only develop a positive organizational culture but 
also motivate other employees of an organization to oversee all the matters of 
operation of the organization effectively (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Carter et 
al., 2010). Furthermore, these directors are elected from the competitive 
economic market (Kaplan & Rauh, 2013). In the market, both male and female 
members are available; however, concerning various personality features, 
leadership, and management, both the counterparts are different from each 
other (Sorensen & Sorenson, 2007). So it’s very important to highlight the role 
of female executive directors on firm performance. As for the role of non-
executive directors is concerned, they are mainly responsible for monitoring 
the performance of executive management that they contribute towards 
achieving the firm’s goals (Carter et al., 2010). Experts believe that firms with 
female non-executive directors deal more effectively with the corporate board 
(Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 2012) and incline to emphasize long-term priorities 
and enhance firms' performance. Women directors are likely to be more in tune 
with the concept of whistle-blowing than men, which helps develop a 
successful corporate board (Adams et al., 2015; Carter et al., 2010). Similarly, 
if managed effectively, women executives play a positive role in the boardroom 
and organization (e.g., Kosnik, 1990). Many researchers highlighted the 
difficulties faced by women in obtaining executive positions in comparison to 
non-executive directors and term this phenomenon as "double-glass-ceiling" 
(Saeed, Belghitar, & Yousaf, 2016). In light of these pieces of evidence, the 
following hypothesis is developed:  
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H2: The women executive directors have a significant impact on a firm's 
performance in Asian markets.  
2.3 Family ownership and firm’s performance  
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), family ownership is the agency 
conflict where they manipulate personal gains at the cost of the minority. For 
instance, they may waste the resources on lucrative projects to please their non-
pecuniary reward (Demsetz, 1983); and treat the company as a personal asset 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). They can occupy high positions instead of 
employing competent professionals on board (Carney & Gedajlovic, 2002). 
Such firms are more likely to underperform those with dispersed shareholding 
pattern (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Stulz, 2006). On the contrary, according to 
the "Stewardship theory" managers act as stewards, despite agents, get 
advanced utility from pro-organizational, collectivistic activities in contrast to 
idiosyncratic, self-serving behavior assumed in agency theory (Morck & 
Yeung, 2004; Lane et al., 2006). In the recent past, the researchers also 
reported about firms with family-ownership that produced high value and better 
performance as compared to their counterparts (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; 
Yammeesri & Lodh, 2004; DeAngelo et al., 2006). Moreover, Yammeesri and 
Lodh (2004) reported that founding family firms will perform better when 
agency conflicts are too severe and legal protection is quite poor or even 
moderate. Hence, the study offers the following hypothesis:  
H3:  Family ownership has a significant impact on firms' performance in 
Asian markets.  
2.4 Institutional ownership and firm’s performance 
Institutional ownership can affect firm performance from three different 
perspectives. As per the "active monitoring" view, they minimize not only the 
asymmetric level of information but also the problem of agency through 
monitoring mechanism and improve firm performance (Burkart, Panunzi, & 
Shleifer, 2003). They apply their high skills, professional expertise, and voting 
powers to inspire management and enhance both firms' performance and 
governance. Similarly, institutional investors use their financial sources in 
expansion if needed (Elyasiani & Jia, 2010). Secondly, as per the "passive 
monitoring" view, they are treated as short-term investors who are opportunist 
and interested in speculative trading profits based on insider information 
(David, Kochhar, & Levitas, 1998) to gratify their portfolio returns (Elyasiani 
& Jia, 2010) in place of improving corporate governance and firm 
performance. Hence, the researcher may expect weak or no association of 
institutional investors and a firm's performance (Duggal & Millar, 1999). 
Thirdly, the "exploitation" view states that institutional investors may exploit 
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the minority shareholders' rights through their influence over management and 
impair firm performance. Particularly, it is expected that they may overlook 
managers' manipulation as long as they are benefited. Ultimately, this attitude 
may negatively impact a firm's performance (Elyasiani & Jia, 2010). 
Nevertheless, the literature provides inclusive pieces of evidence on the 
association of institutional investors and firms' performance (Gompers & 
Metrick, 2001). Due to these inconclusive pieces of evidence, the study offers 
the following hypothesis: 
H4:  Institutional investors have a significant impact on a firm's performance 
in Asian markets. 
2.5 Government ownership and firm’s performance  
It is believed that private firms outperform state-owned firms in competitive 
markets (Megginson & Netter, 2001), as state-owned firms dearth adequate 
entrepreneurial ambition and incline to be politically instead of economically 
driven, which may cause low financial performance (Mak & Li, 2001). In 
China, the state-owned firm earned 50% lower profit than the private firms as 
they are sheltered from competitive pressures and some other reasons listed by 
Kowalski, Büge, Sztajerowska, and Egeland (2013). However, other 
researchers believe that state-owned firms are less likely to face the issue of 
information asymmetry (Eng & Mak, 2003) and such firms can generate 
financing from different sources easily as compared to a private firm (Grosvold 
& Brammer, 2011). These firms also encounter fewer regulatory issues and 
focus more on accounting choices that enhance their performances (Aljifri & 
Moustafa, 2007). The empirics highlight quite contradictory results for the 
association of state ownership and a firm's performance (Ang & Ding, 2006). 
This study puts the following hypothesis in this regard:  
H5:  State ownership has a significant impact on a firm's performance in 
Asian countries.  
2.6 Board interlock and firm’s performance 
The "Resources Dependence Theory" explains the reasons for board 
interlocking among firms (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). The interlocking may 
provide benefits to firms, including resources (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 
2000), strategic support from important external agents; legitimacy to their 
organizations (Haunschild, 1993; Shropshire, 2010), and obtaining 
performance (Kim, 2005). Kim (2005) explored the association between board 
interlocking and performance using social networks in Korean companies and 
found positive impacts of the density of corporate networks on firm 
performance. Generally, when board members are interlinked, they observe the 
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actions of other board members (Filatotchev & Toms, 2003; Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003), and these results in a significant organizational learning 
process, specifically concerning firms' performance (Bhimani, 2008). 
Interlocks can diminish incentives for resourcefulness by aggregating the 
shared flow of information among exchange partners. Studies reported the 
significant relation of interlocking directorates in terms of the flow of firm 
business practices and strategic outcomes, like implementing a poison pill 
takeover guard (Westphal & Zajac, 1995) the multi-divisional form (Rubach & 
Picou, 2005), and attaining external financing (Mizruchi & Stearns, 2003). 
Consequently, based on resource-dependence theory, the following hypothesis 
is suggested. 
H6: The average numbers of interlocking directors have a significant impact 
on a firm's performance.  
2.7 Variable description 
In-line with the existing literature (e.g., Haslam et al., 2010; Joecks et al., 2013) 
that used return on equity (ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA) as proxies for 
the performance of firms and corporate profitability with gender diversity, this 
study also used ROE and ROA as dependent variables. Both ROE and ROA 
data were extracted from "Thomson Financial DataStream". This research also 
applies Tobin-Q as a firm performance measure for robustness test as it is 
considered the most suitable proxy for firm performance (Adams et al., 2015; 
Garcia-Castro, Ariño, & Canela, 2010). The women representation on board is 
explained as the number of woman directors to total directors with variable F-
power. This is applied as a proxy of board size relative to the fraction of 
women on the board. For gender diversity, the study uses three different 
measures. Firstly, the study used the percentage of women to total board's size 
and it is represented by P-women. Secondly, the study calculates two more 
variables for measuring gender diversity that takes into accounts both the 
gender representation and the evenness of the distribution of board members 
between them (Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008). To determine the 
combination of these attributes of gender diversity, the study attempts to 
balance and variety into "dual concept" measures of both diversity (Reguera-
Alvarado et al., 2017). This study calculates two variables of diversity based on 
this concept of the Blau and Shannon indices. This study measures the Blau 
index as to where Pi is the representation of the percentage of 
each category on the board and n represents the total number of members from 
the board. The value of the Blau index is always between 0 and 0.5. It is equal 
to 0 when there is no female presentation and 0.5 in the case of gender parity. 
Similarly,  where pi and n terms as the same in the equation 
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of Shannan index. The value ranges from 0 to 0.69 as the minimum value is in 
event of no woman representation and maximum in event of parity. 
3. Methodology 
The data on the board's composition and firm's characteristics are obtained 
from the OSIRIS databases compiled by Bureau van Dijk (BvD). The rest of 
the data on directors' position, ownership structure, and gender diversity, is 
extracted from the company's financial reports for the period from 2007 to 
2018. After excluding the firms with missing data on variables constructed for 
the study, the finding sample included 248 firms from India, 286 from China, 
182 from Japan, 174 from Singapore, 168 from Korea, and 136 firms from 
Singapore. These firms almost cover 40% and above of the market 
capitalization of each country. Finally, the study produced 14328 firm-year 
observations. Statistics of the main data are shown in table 2. The average 
displays that the ratio of female directors is above 8% for Thailand, India, 
China, and Singapore; whereas, in Japan this average is the lowest among 
others.  
Table 2 Percentage of Women Directors (Yearly) 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Ave. 
China 6.44 7.47 7.52 7.51 7.51 7.72 8.71 8.66 9.66 9.66 8.68 8.68 8.19 
India 7.14 7.01 8.52 8.01 7.04 8.03 8.99 8.94 9.01 9.11 9.17 9.18 8.35 
Japan 5.49 6.18 7.57 7.53 6.41 6.88 6.98 6.99 7.61 8.56 8.18 8.31 7.22 
Korea 6.05 7.08 7.13 7.12 7.12 7.33 8.32 8.27 9.27 9.27 8.29 8.29 7.80 
Singapore 6.44 7.47 7.52 7.51 7.51 7.72 8.71 8.66 9.66 9.66 8.68 8.68 8.19 
Thailand 6.83 7.86 7.91 7.9 7.9 8.11 9.1 9.05 10.05 10.05 10.07 10.07 8.58 
3.1 Construction of instrumental variables for study 
There exists a serious concern of potential endogeneity and reverse causality 
problems in the case of gender diversity and firms' performance (Gul, Srinidhi, 
& Ng, 2011; Adams et al., 2015). To address this, the study defines 
instrumental variable which is insignificantly correlated to firm's performance 
but with control variables. Moreover, it is also vital that these instrumental may 
correlate with endogenous variables. For this study, it is expected that 
instrumental variables predict rationally endogenous variables (W-Power, B-
index, and S-index) but having an insignificant correlation with disturbance 
term in the study model (ROE). Therefore, the study applied three instrumental 
variables to address these two conditions; visibility of the firm (F-visibility), 
enforcement of gender representation law (GR), and the compensation paid to 
outside directors (NED-compensation).  
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In literature, the measures of a firm's visibility are quite mixed. The study 
operationalized the firm's visibility by using a dummy variable = 1 if a firm is 
listed on IBEX in India, Nikkei 225 in Japan, otherwise zero. The listing of 
firms on these listing agencies helps the firms to be explored by investors, 
different media, and other activists (Garcia-Castro et al., 2010). The second 
measure relates to the effects of the implementation of mandatory law. For the 
last two to three decades, many countries in Asia implemented law obligating 
firms to have minimum numbers of females on their boards. As the 
implementation of this law encourages female representation on board, the 
probability of higher female representation is also quite higher. To investigate 
the effect of the law on gender diversity, the variable law takes the value of 
zero before implementation otherwise 1. This divides the period into two sub-
periods that is before the enactment of the law of equality and after its 
promulgation. The third variable represents the directors' compensation. The 
literature highlighted the significance of moderate directors' compensation 
associated with high performance (Garcia-Castro et al., 2010). The study takes 
the natural logarithm of directors’ compensation (NED-compensation) as 
instrumental variables. 
3.2  Model specification for OLS and GMM regression 
To serve the afore-mentioned objectives, two different techniques are used. The 
main reason behind this division is the causality and potential endogeneity 
associated with the expected relationship of gender diversity and firm 
performance. Moreover, to assume from theoretical perspectives that this 
relationship is endogenously determined, the study uses the 1st-difference 
“Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)” as mentioned in earlier studies 
(Baum, Checherita-Westphal, & Rother, 2013; Wintoki et al., 2012). During 
the execution of the 2-stage instrumental variables regression, the study 
assumes that there is a possibility to determine gender diversity in terms of a 
set of variables that has a significant correlation with the diversity variable but 
not with the dependent variable. For this purpose, the study uses the following 
equation.  
 
Where ROA is the dependent variable, a proxy for financial performance, 
gender diversity represents three measures of diversity namely women's power 
(W-power), Blau index (B-index), and Shannon index (S-index). The study 
also uses three measures of ownership structure; namely, Family, institutional, 
and state ownership. Board characteristics comprise of board size, board 
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remuneration, board meeting, female executive/non-executive directors, and 
board interlock. The control variables are the firm's size, age, financial 
leverage, asset tangibility, research and development expenditure, product 
market share, and two macro-economic variables (GDP and exchange rate). 
Lastly, the country dummy is used to capture the country's effects and  
represents the error term.  
3.3 Estimation of instrumental variables 
Following literature (Baum, Schaffer, & Stillman, 2007; Campbell & Minguez, 
2008; Gul et al., 2011), the endogeneity test is applied to assess its existence 
between gender diversity and a firm's performance. The results in Table 3 show 
significance for this test, which validates the existence of endogeneity in the 
case of all six selected economies. So, the results advocate the validity of 
variables constructed for gender diversity (women power, Blau and Shannon 
indices). The study addresses the endogeneity and causality issues and 
considers instrumental and control variables as predictors following Adams and 
Ferreira (2009). 
Table 3 Results of the Endogeneity Test  
 
w-power B-index S-index 
Country China   
Value test  5.809**  3.901**  4.671** 
P-value  0.020  0.0486  0.0163 
 
Korea 
Value test  1.926**  2.15**  2.078** 
P-value  0.0103  0.315  0.0514 
 
India 
Value test  1.020*  1.876**  0.875* 
P-value  0.0740  0.0291  0.0976 
 
Singapore 
Value test  6.092**  5.89**  3.092*** 
P-value  0.0311  0.0152  0.0041 
 
Japan 
Value test 5.761** 4.862**  3.910** 
P-value 0.023 0.0187  0.0401 
   Thailand 
 
Value test  2.043**  1.923*  1.0072* 
P-value 0.052 0.0701  0.0691 
Further, this study considers instrumental and control variables as 
predictors to address the endogeneity and causality issues (Adams & Ferreira, 
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2009). The findings from the 1st stage instrumental variables estimation are 
presented in appendix 1. The study regresses three different models due to the 
high correlation between these measures. The results of the women executive 
and non-executive directors are significant in model 2 and model 3 
respectively, so the study presents their results in these two models only. The 
value is average 40% for China, 62% for India, 49% for Japan, 36% for 
Korea, 42% for Singapore, and 32% for Thailand. Concerning instrumental 
variables, the variable firm's visibility and board remuneration are significant 
and the coefficient values follow our prediction. Importantly, the results also 
show positive and significant impacts of last year's performance on gender 
diversity in all three measures. For the variable of law, the findings showed a 
significant association between law and gender diversity in the case of Japan, 
India, and Singapore. These results support our initial prediction.  
3.4 Regression results of GMM model 
The GMM regression results are presented in Table 4 below. The findings from 
the SARGAN test of over-identifying restrictions do not reject the validity of 
the instrument. Moreover, the test of second-order correlation and the statistic 
of second-order serial correlation of error term confirm the non-existence of 
second-order correlation. The study discusses the country-wise results as under. 
In the second stage of analysis, this study analyzes the effects of three diversity 
measures (w-power, B-index, and S-index) on a firm's performance- female 
diversity has already been instrumented by using firm visibility, law, and board 
remuneration. According to table IV, the results depict a positive association 
between gender diversity (w-power, B-index, and S-index) and firm 
performance in the case of all six economies. Asian firms are likely to have 
fewer females on corporate boards as compared to European firms; however, 
the link between diversity and performance is positive. The findings hence 
validate the study hypothesis H1 and in-line with earlier studies (e.g., Baum et 
al., 2013; Câmara, Chung, & Wang, 2009; Post & Byron, 2015), that gender 
diversity significantly impacts firm performance because of the different 
perspective and experience it offers to the corporate board. Despite variation in 
significance level, the results reveal the importance of gender diversity on 
corporate boards in Asia.  
In the context of corporate governance, this study finds a significant impact 
of executive female directors on a firm's performance in Asia. Executive 
directors have profound business and industry knowledge with business 
strategy and direction; so, capable to face competitive pressures. Similarly, 
they possess technical know-how in their functional area and have greater 
access to company information than non-executive directors. The results 
confirm their fiduciary relation to acting in a manner that is legally befitting of 
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their role as a director and which places the interests of the firm ahead of their 
own. The female executive directors enhance the value of boards via their deep 
understanding of the business and industry, strategy, competitive pressures, 
technical expertise in their field, and superior relative information about the 
firm. So, having a thorough understanding of these important issues, the female 
executives are in a better position to make informed and effective decisions. 
This results in the improvement of firm performance. In contrast, the female 
non-executive director has an insignificant role in firm performance in the case 
of China, Japan, and Singapore (see e.g., Ben‐Amar et al., 2013; Erhardt et al., 
2003). For the last few years, an increasing trend of posting female members 
on the non-executive positions has been evident; however, the executive 
positions are still dominated by male members in these countries. So 
appointing females as non-executive directors does not serve the purpose and it 
seems that these firms are only playing the number game. However, the role of 
board independence is significant in these economies which justifies. The 
independent directors have more confidence and self-esteem and openly share 
his or her opinion in front of the board. They are capable to boost the 
motivation of managers' commitments to fulfill the stakeholders' objectives. 
Similarly, they enhance the reliability of firms' disclosures to the public that 
give positive signals to stock markets. This is true in the Asian context as board 
independence is an important determinant of performance. The insignificance 
of female non-executive directors in these three economies shows that men-
only as executive and not executive directors on corporate boardrooms alive 
and well in China, Japan, and Singapore, while the female only as executive 
directors.  
In the case of India, Korea, and Thailand, the role of the executive, non-
executive directors, and board independence is positively significant in firms' 
performance in line with hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. This significance level may be 
an outcome of different actions and law amendments relating to empowering 
females in a different field. In the case of Korea, female participation remained 
below par since democratization. Against the backdrop of South Korea's 
dramatic parliamentary last elections, female representation in South Korea's 
highest legislative body took a significant positive step forward, which 
represents the largest number of female representatives in both total number 
(51) and percentage (17%) in South Korean history. This female representation 
in the national assembly is almost near to average of the Asian region (19.2%) 
but lags behind the world average (22.8%). Although the proportional female 
representation in the National Assembly lags behind the world average (22.8%) 
and the Asian region (19.2%), recent history shows significant progress for 
South Korean female legislators. The implementation of gender laws, 
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government measures are taken and gender awareness empowers the female 
voices that ultimately may add to the role of women directors both at the 
executive and non-executive director's levels. 
Despite the cultural barriers in Thailand, it is quite evident that females are 
equally treated there. They enjoy a high status and equal rights in this country. 
They also contribute significantly to the screen in this economy. In Asia-Pacific 
countries, Thailand has the second-highest proportion of leadership roles held 
by women (37 percent) following the Philippines (39 percent). The 
implementation of Thailand's Gender Equality Act of 2015 also encourages 
female participation in corporate sectors. This may add to the value of the role 
of both types of female directors. In the case of India, these findings may be the 
results of the various acts such as ‘Protection of Women from Domestic 
Violence’ Act (2005); ‘Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace’ Act 
(2013); and the ‘Hindu Succession’ Act (2005). India is among the first of 
developing economies that imposed a quota of one woman director on the 
board (at minimum), under the legal framework. 
 Board size and board interlock also have a positive impact on the firm's 
performance in Asian firms. Though these results are in-line with existing 
literature (e.g., Filatotchev & Toms, 2003; Hillman et al., 2000; Lipton & 
Lorsch, 1992; Terjesen & Singh, 2008; Veprauskaitė & Adams, 2013), but 
these contradict with some earlier studies (such as Cheng & Liu, 2016; Lin, 
2011; Nguyen, Locke, & Reddy, 2015). In the case of Thailand, the impact of 
board size is negative on firms' performance implying higher board is exposed 
to complex issues that may delay decisions and opportunities go begging. 
Secondly, in a larger board, it is very hard to align the interest of different 
stakeholders and this may harm the efficient decisions (Cheng & Liu, 2016; 
Ehikioya, 2009; Lin, 2011). The board meeting also positively impacts a firm's 
performance in Asia.  
The results also highlight the effects of various ownership structures on the 
firms' performances in the Asian major economies. For instance, institutional 
investors influence firms to be operated under effective governance. They also 
make sure that the organization along with pursuing the long-term goals must 
act in the best favor of shareholders. More importantly, they possess the 
necessary expertise and experience of running the business and hence can 
effectively monitor the management of the firm. Therefore, it is argued that 
large institutional investors are better in any case and have more respect and 
importance than minority shareholders. In contrast, some researchers also 
exhibited the flipside of institutional investors (Boubaker & Labégorre, 2008; 
Anderson & Reeb, 2003). So, in contrast to the signaling advantage of 
resource-dependency theory, the study observed a negative impact of state 
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ownership on firms' performances of Indian firms. In an emerging market like 
India, the negative association can be due to serving other objectives like 
employment, government control. At the same time, the poor governance 
mechanism like ineffective monitoring, poor transparency, and ambiguous 
accountability generally lead to a decline in performance. Similarly, the 
association of state ownership and firms' performance remains significant as 
per agency theory for other economies. 
The results show a positive impact of family ownership on firms' 
performance in Asian economies. In Asian societies where family ownership is 
very common in small and medium firms, this relationship is more prominent. 
Family-owned firms are free from outside investors and hence, plan for the 
long term. Another important aspect of these enterprises is that they want to 
survive in the long term to support their next generations and communities. For 
the remaining control variables, the findings were in-line with the existing 
literature. 
Table 4 Results of Dynamic Panel GMM (Dependent variable Tobin Q) 
 China (three different panels) 

















board-size 0.275** 0.063* 0.0550** 
b-independence 0.002* 0.0221* 0.4481* 
b-meeting 0.061* 0.1945* 0.1023** 
b-interlock 0.0532 0.0094* 0.0761* 
I-ownership 0.081 0.0023 0.3564 
s-ownership 0.092* 0.0564 0.0191* 
F-ownership 0.5643** 0.980** 1.082** 


















board-size 0.012* 0.1671* 0.005** 
b-independence 0.201** 0.543* 0.502* 
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b-meeting 0.018** 0.1441** 0.033** 
b-interlock 1.928** 1.187** 1.432** 
I-ownership 0.0861 0.187** 0.012* 
s-ownership -0.0822* -0.187** -0.0342** 
F-ownership 3.876*** 2.080** 1.896*** 



















board-size 0.038* 0.674* 0.067* 
b-independence 0.040** 0.563** 0.017** 
b-meeting 0.015** 0.098* 0.016** 
b-interlock 0.075** 0.654** 0.195** 
I-ownership 0.106* 0.252** 0.102* 
s-ownership 0.0214* 0.054* 0.0443* 
F-ownership 0.0065** 0.0876** 0.0656** 
Control variable Included Included Included 
 
Korea 















board-size 0.220** 0.156* 0.028** 
b-independence 0.3817* 0.0765 0.7025* 
b-meeting 0.1932** 0.242** 1.004* 
b-interlock 0.218*** 0.4261** 0.0675** 
I-ownership 0.0601** 0.0564** 0.0312** 
s-ownership 0.013 0.0092 0.0065 
F-ownership 0.6536*** 0.187*** 0.0548*** 
Control variable Included Included Included 
 
Singapore 
F-director 0.176*  
 
B-index  1.1024** 
 
S-index   1.1516** 




board-size 0.0961* 0.0513* 0.0654* 
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b-independence 0.0373** 0.0486** 0.029** 
b-meeting 0.112** 1.0879** 0.2187** 
b-interlock 0.2064** 0.1765** 0.1602** 
I-ownership 0.0357** 0.0764** 0.0589** 
s-ownership 0.004* 0.0476 0.0032 
F-ownership 0.25646** 0.0654** 0.226** 



















board-size -0.172* -0.049** -0.059* 
b-independence 0.0083 0.0087* 0.016* 
b-meeting 0.0626* 0.0555* 0.0251** 
b-interlock 0.0901* 0.04848** 0.1771** 
I-ownership 0.00645 0.0065 0.0099 
s-ownership 0.0050*** 0.0013** 0.056** 
F-ownership 3.017*** 1.045*** 2.0659** 
Control variable Included Included Included 
***, **, and * indicate a significance of less than 1 %, less than 5 %, and less than 10 %, 
respectively 
4. Analysis and Findings 
The subsequent text aimed at elaborating the findings. 
4.1 Comparison of developing and developed market 
Developing economies experience the phase of development and their market 
structure, behavior, and measure of the performance vary across the board. 
Therefore, it is critical to examine the finding of the study across these 
segments of economies (the findings are given in Table 3). The study divided 
the sample into three different groups (all economies, developed markets, and 
emerging markets) and three models are regressed.   
The results showed a significant association between gender diversity 
variables (W-power, B-index, and S-index) and the firm's performance in all 
three models. At the same time, the study observed a higher significance level 
for emerging markets indicating that gender diversity has a more important role 
to play in economies where governance mechanisms and shareholders 
protection are on the weaker side.  This study also highlighted the role of the 
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female executive and non-executive directors and found the significant 
association of female non-executive directors in the case of overall and 
emerging markets. Nonetheless, the role of non-executive directors is 
insignificant in developed economies. This may be because agency conflicts 
are not prominent in developed markets and shareholders have other 
mechanisms to control management interest. Board independence has an 
insignificant impact on firm performance in the case of developed markets. 
This is in line with the notion that an independent board is not expected to have 
a stake in the firm's business (Fama & French, 2001; Williamson, 1984). As the 
ownership concentration is among the main factors of firms’ performance, the 
effects of board independence on firms’ performance in highly concentrated 
ownership structure linger uncertain (Klein, Shapiro, & Young, 2005; Lefort & 
Urzúa, 2008) like Asian developed countries. 
Additionally, a positive role of state ownership in a firm's performance in a 
developed market and a negative role of the same variable in emerging markets 
is found. There is a greater scope of government intervention in these markets 
because there are many more market failures. At the same time, the higher cost 
of interventions may be a result of poor governance and more prevalent 
corruption (Stulz, 2005). There often exists the "twin agency" problem of 
expropriation by insiders and the government that destabilize the investment. 
Table 5:  Comparison of Three Different Samples (all Firms, Developed and 
Developing Market Firms) 
 Results of all countries analysis 
(F-director) (B-index) (S-index) 















board-size 0.020* 0.156* 0.028** 
b-independence 0.3817* 0.0765 0.7025* 
b-meeting 0.134** 0.142** 0.904*** 
b-interlock 0.0808* 0.0261* 0.0675* 
I-ownership 0.0023* 0.0076 0.157** 
S-ownership 0.013 0.0092 0.0065 
F-ownership 0.0222*** 0.070** 0.0548* 
A-tangibility 0.0555* 0.0145* 0.0672* 
F-size 0.0561* 0.0671* 0.035** 
f-age 0.0352 0.0798 0.1128 
R&D Exp 0.0053* 0.0201* 0.0014 
F-leverage -0.0015 -0.0004 0.0009 
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P-M-share 0.231** 0.312** 0.761** 
GDP 0.0546* 0.0561* 0.06 
Exchange rate -0.099* -0.0310* -0.0010* 
Results of developed countries analysis 
F-director 0.0765*  
 
B-index  0.1024* 
 
S-index   0.1516** 




board-size 0.0961* 0.0513* 0.0654* 
b-independence 0.0373 0.0486 0.0292 
b-meeting 0.112*** 1.0879** 0.2187** 
b-interlock 0.5001** 0.1046** 0.0602** 
I-ownership 0.00708 0.0531* 0.0361** 
S-ownership 0.034* 0.0456 0.0652 
F-ownership 0.040** 0.0604** 0.226** 
A-tangibility 0.0465** 0.0208* 0.0541* 
F-size 0.0098 0.00100* 0.07103 
f-age 0.1654* 0.0093* 0.0187* 
R&D Exp 0.002* 0.0087* 0.021** 
F-leverage 0.0061 0.0065 0.0068 
P-M-share 0.144** 0.1667* 0.143** 
GDP 0.0056* 0.018* 0.0046 
Exchange rate -0.0216* -0.021* -0.0161* 
Results of Emerging Countries Analysis 
F-director 2.271**   
B-index  1.092**  
S-index   1.094** 




board-size 0.17255 0.04978 0.0595 
b-independence 0.0545** 0.0677** 0.349*** 
b-meeting 0.0626* 0.0555* 0.0251** 
b-interlock 0.0911* 0.048** 0.053** 
I-ownership 0.00312* 0.1116* 0.0506** 
S-ownership -0.0167* -0.0213 -0.056* 
F-ownership 2.001*** 1.056** 2.065*** 
A-tangibility 0.0164* 0.0065* 0.0182** 
F-size 0.0091** 0.012 0.001* 
f-age 0.0311 0.009 0.0677* 
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R&D Exp 0.005* 0.0143* 0.059* 
F-leverage -0161* -0.0134* -0.0132* 
P-M-share 0.235** 0.067* 0.185** 
GDP 0.0681** 0.0870* 0.0867** 
Exchange rate -0.0091 0.00301 0.0301 
4.2 Robustness test (alternative measure of firm performance)  
This study also tested the sensitivity of finding to the use of Tobin Q of another 
proxy of firm performance following existing literature (Campbell & Mínguez-
Vera, 2008; Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Garcia-Castro et al., 2010).  For this 
purpose, the study re-estimated the results with three different techniques. 
Firstly, the study applied the pool Ordinary least Square technique. The results 
in the un-tabulated table depict a similar coefficient sign with a slight change in 
value as reported by GMM results with ROA. Secondly, the study regressed the 
fixed effect model based on Hausmann selection criteria and the results of the 
fixed effect model also confirm our earlier finding. The study found only 
differences in the level of significance for family ownership, board interlock, 
and female non-executive directors which are quite negligible in this case. As a 
result, the study can sum up the results as, "robust" and free from self-selection 
biases. The results are not presented only due to words limitation.    
4.3 Effect of the law on board gender diversity  
Being a woman on the corporate board is not easy; as issues related to gender 
parity and diversity seem to plague the corporate sector. And despite some 
laudable efforts, firms are a long way off from closing this diversity gap. The 
implementation of diversity law and governance mechanism put companies 
under increasing pressure to enter more females on their governing boards. The 
diversity law exists almost in all economies but it does not bind the firm to 
follow the strict rule of diversity. Out of the six countries included in the 
sample, the diversity law exists in Thailand and India, where a firm is required 
to have a specific number of females in the boardroom. In India, the 
government implemented a quota requiring firms at minimum one woman 
director on board. Likewise, in 2015, Thailand's "Gender Equality Act" comes 
into effect. This is a legitimate tool that requires a firm to have at least one 
member on board. It's very important to investigate the impacts of diversity law 
on woman representation in the boardroom. The study presents the results in 
table VI below. The study highlights the significance of mandatory law 
concerning female representation in the boardroom. The results show a 
significant association between the implementation of law and diversity 
measures (W-power, B-index, and S-index).  These results confirm that the 
promotion of mandatory law is a key factor for contributing higher presence of 
women on board. According to the finding of the study, this mechanism needs 
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to be employed in countries which lag behind the existence of woman on 
board. 
Table 6: Implementation of Mandatory Law and Gender Diversity 












Law 1.21** 0.33* 0.14** 2.29*** 1.64*** 1.57*** 
Adj. – R2 0.021 0.023 0.022 0.017 0.019 0.011 
F-Test 4.65** 3.01* 5.16** 4.07*** 6.56*** 6.65*** 
Haussmann 
Test 
0.04 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.05 
The coefficient sig. level 1%, 5% and 10% is indicated by ***, ** and * respectively. 
4.4 Tokenism and firm performance 
Despite strong urgings for a greater number of females in corporate boards 
(Burkart et al., 2003; Singh & Zammit, 2006), their role is still as tokens 
(Daily, Dalton, & Cannella Jr, 2003; Singh & Zammit, 2006; Terjesen et al., 
2015). There are empirics on female directors but it’s very difficult to find a 
direct correlation of gender diversity with firms’ performance (Terjesen et al., 
2015). Therefore, the study shows an interesting aspect of the association 
between gender diversity in corporate boards to the firm's performance. Based 
on "Critical Mass Theory", the study investigates the role of female directors 
on firms' performance in Asia. Hence, it's an effort to reveal that the majority 
employs more effect in a group than the minority does, by virtue of their higher 
number. Minorities are simply marginalized if they have a modest presence in a 
larger group and the concept of tokenism prevails (Gordini & Rancati, 2017). 
The question arises whether the gender ratio on the boardroom improves the 
firm performance or not. Secondly, diversity may be caused by reverse 
causality.  The study removes the possibility of any reverse causal relationship 
by constructing instrumental variables. Some of the researchers do believe that 
more women on the board mean chosen more forward-thinking business 
practices generally (Torchia et al., 2011).  For this purpose, the study applied a 
t-test; as the output from independent samples t-test informs us how far the 
mean value of one sample is from the mean of the other group. This reports the 
mean of each group, the average difference between the groups, and the 
significance of this difference. The main objective of this research is to 
examine tokenism and study for the purpose, the study divides the samples into 
different groups (females = 0; females ≤ 5%; females ≤ 10%; females ≤ 15%; 
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females ≤ 20%; females above 20%). Through this differentiation, we can 
justify the results of whether tokenism persists in Asia or not.  
The results have been shown in Table. These provided quite interesting 
facts for Asian economies. In group I, the firms are divided into two samples; 
i.e. firms having no woman director and firms having at least one woman 
director or above. The results of the first group show a significant difference in 
the means value of ROA at 10% of the two samples. This shows firms having 
female representation on board having more return on assets as compared to 
their counterpart. Similarly, there is a significant difference in board size at the 
5% level for firms having at least one female on their board. The level of board 
independence for diversified firms is also on the higher side with a significance 
level of 1%. The study also explores the number of meetings is statistically 
significant in diversified board and the results confirmed the significant 
difference in a meeting where female representation is prominent. The results 
of board interlock are statistically different for firms having more female 
representation on their corporate board (for 20% or above and 15% female 
representation). 
In the case of ownership structure, the study found a statistically significant 
difference between the means value of state ownership of diversified and non-
diversified firms. In contrast, family ownership has negative statistical value 
with significant impacts showing that gender diversity is negatively related to 
family ownership. Lastly, the study found no significant difference in the 
means value of institutional ownership in Asian countries. Similarly, the study 
found a statistically significant difference in the case of firm size, research and 
development expenditures, and product market shares of firms. However, 
financial leverage is quite lower in firms where female ownership is significant 
in terms of their representation. The study proves their significant role rather 
than tokenism. This shows their significant role in the corporate board rather 
than tokenism. 
Table 7 Group Comparison 
 Group 1 
female=0 female≥ 1 Difference t-test 
ROA 6.13 6.577 -1.762* 
board-size 9.97 10.76 -2.50** 
b-independence 2.13 3.57 -7.96*** 
b-meeting 7.519 8.23 -2.192** 
b-interlock 0.0096 0.01064 0.0271 
I-ownership 0.185 0.8612 0.116 
S-ownership 0.18821 0.177 1.672* 
F-ownership 0.143 0.172 -1.909* 
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F-size 9.95 9.053 0.0897 a 
f-age 31.07 26.55 -2.78** 
A-tangibility 0.652 1.17 -1.39 
R&D Exp. 0.089 0.054 0.923 
F-leverage 0.0011 0.0091 -0.421 
P-M-share 0.7656 1.6964 1.662* 





Female above 20% 15%< female ≤ 20% Difference t-test 
ROA 8.084 6.562 4.652*** 
board-size 11.48 11.25 -0.932 
b-independence 2.02 2.46 -0.684 
b-meeting 7.12 6.08 2.082*** 
b-interlock 0.0095 0.0023 3.026** 
I-ownership 0.23 0.12 0.052 
S-ownership 0.0824 0.1936 -1.720* 
F-ownership 0.266 0.242 0.0432 
F-size 6.84 8.943 4.028**a 
f-age 24.64 26.56 11.44*** 
A-tangibility 1.024 1.932 -0.625 
R&D Exp. 0.964 0.561 2.8101*** 
F-leverage 0.0121 0.0071 0.0761 
P-M-share 2.675 1.763 5.671*** 





15%< female ≤ 20% 
10%< female ≤ 
15% 
Difference t-test 
ROA 7.062 5.652 6.782*** 
board-size 9.65 10.44 -1.886* 
b-independence 2.282 2.68 1.468 
b-meeting 8.12 7.22 2.717** 
b-interlock 0.011 0.013 1.692* 
I-ownership 0.882 0.65 0.667 
S-ownership 0.0642 0.9978 -3.768** 
F-ownership 0.1624 0.142 0.051 
F-size 8.083 7.092 1.871* a 
f-age 22.53 23.02 1.674* 
A-tangibility 0..838 0.932 -0.226 
R&D Exp. 0.174 0.054 1.766* 
F-leverage 0.007 0.00812 -0.132 
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P-M-share 1.6753 0.9873 2.6754** 





10%< female ≤ 15% 
5%< female ≤ 
10% 
Difference t-test 
ROA 8.02 6.467 3.652** 
board-size 9.86 9.65 0.657 
b-independence 5.02 5.46 -0.684 
b-meeting 8.409 8.12 0.082 
b-interlock 0.0085 0.00954 0.026 
I-ownership 0.542 1.06 -2.50** 
S-ownership 0.07821 1.067 -3.062*** 
F-ownership 0.153 0.142 1.719* 
F-size 9.84 8.943 1.65* a 
f-age 30.96 26.44 11.67** 
R&D Exp. 0.075 0.7512 0.006 
F-leverage 0.067 0.079 0.0152 
P-M-share 0.053 -0.015 -0.06 





5%< female ≤ 10% 1< female ≤ 5% Difference t-test 
ROA 9.194 7.672 2.769** 
board-size 8.59 9.36 -1.854* 
b-independence 2.13 2.57 1.694* 
b-meeting 7.23 6.19 1.919* 
b-interlock 0.0106 0.0034 0.0271 
I-ownership 1.134 2.042 -0.015 
S-ownership 0.1924 0.2036 -4.78** 
F-ownership 0.176 0.352 5.17** 
F-size 6.95 9.053 4.13*** a 
f-age 24.75 26.67 3.55** 
R&D Exp. 0.64 0.33 0.162 
F-leverage 0.281 0.273 0.191 
P-M-share 0.067 0.04 0.012 





female =1 female=0 Difference t-test 
ROA 7.172 7.062 1.892* 
board-size 10.76 9.55 1.694* 
b-independence 2.392 1.79 6.67*** 
b-meeting 8.23 7.33 1.627 
 
Sarhad Journal of Management Sciences (SJMS) 
 
249 Vol. 6, Issue 2  ISSN 2414-2336 (Print), ISSN 2523-2525 (Online) 
 
b-interlock 0.0121 0.0141 0.0271 
I-ownership 0.948 1.042 -0.116 
S-ownership 0.1742 1.1078 -2.658*** 
F-ownership 0.1724 0.152 1.761* 
F-size 7.193 4.202 -2.78** a 
f-age 22.65 23.13 -0.0584 
R&D Exp. 0.992 0.76 0.777 
F-leverage 0.081 0.173 0.091 
P-M-share 0.066 0.054 0.008 
No of firms 405 450 
 
5. Discussion on Findings 
The findings show different pertinent conclusions. Firstly, the study highlights 
the positive significant impact of gender diversity (more female as board 
members) on firms' performances in Asia, this is in line with the earlier 
findings (e.g., Bonn & Fisher, 2005; Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Carter 
et al., 2010). Furthermore, the fact that gender diversity adds value to a firm is 
also consistent with the "resource-based perspective". Consequently, the female 
presence on board is required to be promoted by external intimidating measures 
(like mandatory laws) and from within firms because of labor and social 
justice. So, it is beyond dispute that their presence on board may offer firms 
and society with extensive social and ethical advances (Harjoto, Laksmana, & 
Lee, 2015) because this act enhances the actual parity between women and 
men. Despite a shift in national policies and socio-cultural norms, women 
across Asia still have a low proportion as compare to men in the labor force. 
Moreover, female quality of participation is highly diverse, as, despite their 
significant role in economic development, they lag behind men in the formal 
sector and more directed toward the informal sector. Discrimination, unpaid 
care work and family responsibilities, harassment, stereotypes, and gender gaps 
in voice, representation, and leadership in the world of work are some of the 
obstacles women face in moving into better quality jobs and opportunities.  
Besides, in the context of the ''Law of Equality'', the findings show a 
significant increase in female participation on corporate boards due to the 
enactment of this compulsion. The findings suggest that compulsory 
regulations are powerful mechanisms to attain effective gender diversity 
enforcing the execution of the recommendation of mandatory laws in Asia. 
Specifically, the descriptive statistics show a significant increase in female 
representation once the law is enforced in India and Thailand. Hence, the study 
proposes that firms need to have a more effective policy of hiring more females 
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on the corporate board. This would not only enhance their performance but will 
also ensure resource-based views and social visibility.  
Moreover, the study depicts the significant role of female executive 
directors in Asian economies included in the sample size. The results of board 
structure are also significant for board meetings and board interlock. Moreover, 
to this, results also found a significant impact on family and institutional 
ownership on firm performance. It's very important to consider the ownership 
structure in the case of firms' performance. The results predict a significant role 
of family and institutional ownership in the performance of most of the 
economies included in the sample. However, the results depicted an inverse 
impact of state ownership on firms' performance in the case of India while 
contrasting findings have been observed in the case of Thailand. This adds to 
the controversies of state ownership in the case of Asian economies. 
In the next stage, the study compares the developed and developing 
markets and finds quite a significant difference between developed and 
developing markets in Asia. Firstly, gender diversity variables have a 
significant direct effect on firms' performances in developed and developing 
economies. Secondly, the study significant role of woman executive directors 
with a significance level of 1% for emerging markets as compared to 10% in 
the developed market. The female non-executive directive has an insignificant 
role in firm performance in developed markets as compared to emerging 
markets. In developed markets, the board meetings and board interlock have a 
significant role to play in firm performance as their significance level is quite 
higher (1%) when compared to developing markets. State ownership indirectly 
affects the firm financial performance in the case of developing economies. 
The study attributes results in the inefficient state mechanism in emerging 
markets that requires directive and controlling policies. 
6. Conclusion 
The study adds to the research on firm performance and women's presence on 
board in three different means. First, as to the best of our knowledge, the 
current study is the first comparative attempt in an Asian context considering 
the female role in firm performance in Asian major economies. For all 
economies, the study reported a significant direct impact of gender diversity on 
firms' performance. Secondly, the study also tested the effects of mandatory 
law on woman representation on board and found a significant association. The 
results strongly support the enactment of mandatory law to enhance gender 
diversity rather that it is treated as an act of ethics or other moral behaves. 
Thirdly, the study empirically analyzes the endogeneity prospect in the 
association of firms' performance and gender diversity, by using the test of 
endogeneity based on literature support (A. Baum et al., 2013). Fourthly, the 
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study compared the results of developing and developed markets and reports 
quite significant differences in results. Fifthly, the study uses a different 
approach to address the issue of tokenism by creating different samples based 
on female representation and applying t-tests. The results highlighted the 
female significance role in firms where they are in a higher ratio. The t-stats 
also show a significant difference in a board meeting and other governance 
variables where females have a significant representation of the boardroom. 
This supports the maxim of females from tokenism to critical mass. Sixthly, the 
study also highlighted the female role as executive and non-executive directors 
in Asian firms and found females are more influential in firm performance as 
executive directors. We can reap the benefits of female participation by hiring 
and promoting more women as part of the talent pool. Based on these findings, 
the study strongly affirms the regulatory interventions are pertinent assistance 
to upturn the women participation at corporate boards in Asia. As a result, the 
state can be described by a desire to preserve the historical status of male 
dominance as from financial perspectives, the results significantly recommend 
the direct effects of gender diversity on a firm's financial performance. The 
study has strong implications for governments, lawmakers, shareholders, and 
company management. These stakeholders are required to consider the findings 
to augment state policies and business decisions that support the incorporation 
of females in a board. Besides, these findings are also actually motivating for 
those countries where mandatory laws are not applicable to enhance the 
woman's existence on boardrooms, as results highlight positive outcomes- from 
both ethical and economic perspectives.   
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